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IN THE SUPREME CO,UR T 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DONA L .. JOHNSON, on Behalf of 
Herself and All Other Taxpayers of 
the State of Utah, 
-vs.-
Pl a int £ff, R esponrlent 
and Cross-Appellant, 
STATE TAX COMl\HSSION 
OF UTAH, 
Defendant, Appellant 
and Cross-Respondent. 
Case 
No.10555 
Brief of Respondent and Cross-Appellant 
STATEl\IENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action under Title 78-33-2, Utah Code An-
notated, in which the plaintiff, respondent and cross-
appellant in the District Court of Salt Lake County 
prayed for relief as follows : 
1. That the income tax return filed by the plain-
1iff, as well as all other citizens of the State of Utah, prior 
to .T a11uar.Y l, 1966, or any extension thereof, co ye ring 
in<·ome earned during 1965, are properly filecl. 
1 
2. rrhat the applicable ineome blX rate• 011 said in-
eome tax returns filed prior to .January 1, 1966, or auy 
extension thereof, is the rate applicable prior to the ('ll-
actment of H. B. -81, passed by the ~6th Legislature. 
3. That fiiscal year income taxpayers filing income 
tax returns for a period ending during 1965, non-resident 
income taxpayers filing for a period ending during 1965, 
and the estates of deceased persons filing income tax re-
~urns during the calendar year 1965 and based upon 
income tax rates applicable prior to the enactment of 
H. B. -81 ( 36th Legislature) are proper and valid in-
come tax filings. 
4. That H. B. -81 ( 36th Legislature) is unconsti-
tutional and unenforceable under the Utah and Federal 
Constitutions because the application of the income tax 
rates set forth therein are not equally and unformly 
applicable to all Utah citizens of the same class. 
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE BY 
LOWER COURT 
The lower court granted plaintiff, respondent, and 
cross-appellant's Motion for Summary Judgment in the 
following terms : 
1. There is no genuine issue as to any material fact 
alleged in the Complaint. 
2. That the income tax rates provided in H. B. -81 
(3Gth Legislature) do not apply to the plaintiff, D01w 
2 
L . .Johnson, Hor to other Utah iueomc taxpayers who 
filrd i11<·omp tnx return:-; 011 or lwfon• De<·r·mhc1· 31, 10G0. 
3. Section 5 of H. B. -81 ( 36th Legislature) is not 
ambiguous and H. B. -81, as ·well as the statutes imple-
menting said H. B. -81 do not violate provisions of the 
Ptah or Federal Constitutions. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks to confirm the lower conrt 's judgment: 
And: 
"That the income tax rates provided in H. B. -81 
( 36th Legislature) do not apply to the plaintiff, 
Dona L .. Johnson, nor to other Utah income tax-
payers who filed an income tax return on or before 
December :n, 1965." 
"That Section 5 of H. B. -81 ( 36th Legislature) 
is not ambiguous .... '' 
Plaintiff seeks to overrule the following portion of 
the .Judgment of the lower court: 
" ... H. B. -81, as well as the statutes implement-
ing said H. B. -81 do not violate provisions of the 
Utah or Fed0ra] Constitutions." 
STATE"MENT OF FACTS 
The plaintiff is a resident of the State of Utah and 
was rlomiciled in Utah during the entire year of 1965. 
Nhe is a calendar year taxpayer who earned al1 of her 
3 
mcome in the State of 1T tah 11uring the year J 963. Her 
income is, therefore, taxable by the State of Utah. 
'11he 36th Utah Legislature, on the 11 day of March, 
1965, passed an individual income tax law known as 
H. B. -81. 
Section 5 of said H. B. -81 is quoted, as follows: 
"The tax rates provided for herein shall apply to 
all tax returns filed on or after ,January 1, 1966 
for taxable years commencing on or after.January 
1, 1965. '' 
Accordingly, plaintiff and approximately 6,000 other 
citizens of Utah filed 1965 calendar year income tax re-
turns with the defendant Tax Commission, using the 
income tax rates in effect prior to the enactment of 
H B. -81. 
An undisclosed number of estates, non-residents an<l 
persons filing on the basis of a fiscal year, filed tax re-
turns during the year 1965 at the tax rates in effect prior 
to the enactment of H. B. -81. 
The defendant, Tax Commission, has declared that 
the income tax rates provided in H. B. -81, notwith-
standing Section 5 thereof, are applicable only to citizens 
1 
who report their 1965 earnings on a calendar year basis. 
Other Utah citizens who report their earnings on a fiscal 
year basis, or who move from the State of Utah, or who 
die during 1965 need not file under the rates provided in 
H.B. -81. 
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AR GU l\LFJ NT 
POINT I. 
THF, 1963 UT AH LEG ISLA rrURE INTENDED 
THAT THE INrOME TAX RATE INCREASE 
DTPOSED BY H. B. -81 SHOULD NOT APPLY 
EQUALLY rro ALL TAXPAYERS, AND 
SECrt1ION fi OF H. B. -81 WAS INTENTIOR-
ALLY DRAFTED TO PERMIT L~1\ CK OF UNI-
FORMITY AND TO AUTHORIZE EARLY 
FILING OF INCOME TAX RETURNS TO 
A VOID PAYMENT OF THE NE"W HIGHER 
INCOME TAX RArrES IMPOSED BY H. B. 81. 
Section 5 of H. B. -81 is quoted, as follows: 
"The tax rates provided for herein shall apply to 
all returns filed on or after .January l, 1966, for 
taxable years commencing on or after .January 1, 
1965.'' 
H. B. -81, including Section 5, was drafted through 
tlH' joint efforts of attorneys and administratiYe offic0rs 
asRigned to the Governor's Office and the defendant, 
Tax Commission. The Bill was presented to the Com-
mittee on Revenue and Taxation of the House of Repre-
sentatives by Utah's Director of Finance, who is an 
attorney and who has a past record of service as a Com-
missioner with the defendant, Tax Commission. The 
Bill was not drawn by members of the Legislature. 
Defendant Tax Commission quarrels with the de-
rision of the lower court which permits taxpayers to file 
their jncome tax returns at the lower rates provided they 
file prior to January 1, 1966. Yet the intended wording 
5 
of 8ed ion 3 of H. B. -81 and for which the def en<lant 
'l1ax Commission had deep concern was purposely drawn 
to permit fiscal year taxpayers, <lead taxpayers and non-
resident taxpayers to file at the rates in effect prior to the 
passage of H. B. 81. The wording of this section vrns de-
liberate and intentional to avoid the administrative bur-
den of accounting and auditing of prorated tax returns 
during the transitional period of going from the lower 
income tax rates to the higher income tax rates providecl 
in H. B. -81. .Administrative exprdiencr and c011\'e11ie11er1 
offers little, if any, justification for the disparity and 
lack of uniformity imposed upon income taxpa_'l"ers who 
are required to pay the increased tax assessecl. :More-
over, it would be virtually impossible to advance a more 
incon~istent position then to argue that one group of tax-
payers in the same class should be permitted to pay in-
come tax at a lower rate than other income taxpayers in 
the same class in order to justify the administratiYc 
expediency. 
In support of the position that all 1965 calendar year 
taxpayers must file at the new tax rates, defendant Tax 
Commission cites the case of llf echwm, et al. v. State Tax 
Com11iission, No. 10410, just decided by this court. At 
Page 15 of the Record on Appeal in that case, the defend-
ant Commission clearly states: 
"It should be noted that the Bill does not req1tirr 
returns filed in 1965 to be sub.feet to the increased 
rates, but only refitrns filed on or after J arn1wry 1, 
1966." (Emphasis added) 
6 
Arnl again in its brief, at Page 5, the defendant Tax 
Commission urg<Yl this Court in remlering its decision: 
"It should be noted that the Bill does not require 
returns filed in 1965 to be subject to the increased 
rates, but only returns filed on or after .January 1, 
1966, which is after the effective date of the Bill.'' 
Tl1e defendant Tax Commission not only reviewed 
H B. -81 prior to submitting it to the Legislature, but 
the defendant Tax Commission also edited and appro-H'<-1 
the wording of Section 5 in order to preserve the tax 
inequity of the fiscal and short term taxpayer. 
In a companion revenue bill increasing the corporate 
fra11chise tax hy 50 per C('nt, the defendant Tax Com-
mission approved a less complex ('ffectiYe datr clanse. 
Section 6 of that statute, which was also enacted by the 
1965 Legislature (H. B. -68), reads: 
"This A ct shall take effect for all taxable years 
beg-inning after December 31, 1964.'' 
OltYiously, the more complex effective date clause (Sec-
tion 5 of H. B. -81) was for the clear purpose of all°'ving 
disproportionate and unequal income tax filings. 
In its rationale to overrule the clear meaning of Sec-
tion 5 of H. B. -81. def encl.ant Tax Commission refers 
to 59-14-1, Utah Code Annotated, defining taxable year. 
This statute, read carefully, gives no comfort to de-
fonoant 's position, since clearly there is no reference 
therein to income tax rates and the statute obviously 
1ras a<1opted merely to distinguish fiscal and fractional 
fili11gs from calendar year filings. 
7 
Sutherland, in his work on statutory construction, 
discusses uniformity and equality in the imposition of the 
tax burden. He states: 
"\Vhile the power to tax and the exercise of that 
power is indispensable to the effective operntio11 
of government, the rule has been fiirmly estab-
lished that tax laws are to be strictly construe() 
against the State and in favor of th.e taxpayer. 
Therefore, where there is reasonable doubt as to 
the meaning of a revenue statute, it should be re-
solved in favor of those taxed. It was stated in 
Gould v. Gould, one of the leading cases upon the 
subject: 
'In the interpretation of statutes levying 
taxes, it is the established rule not to extend 
their provisions by implication, beyond the 
clear import of the language used, or to en-
large their operation so as to embrace mat-
ters not specifically pointed out. In case of 
doubt, they are construed most strongly 
against the government and in favor of the 
citizen.' 
"A number of theories have been put forth in sus-
taining the soundness of the doctrine. It has been 
suggested that since all taxation must originate 
through Legislation, precedent is lacking for ex-
tending its operation; that tax laws are not found-
ed on a permanent public policy and, therefore, 
should not be extended by implication; that /\ 
rigid application of revenue measures is for the 
protection of the citizen who should be informed 
in unambiguous terms the amount and nature of 
his duty to pay taxes; and, that ~where tax statutes 
impose burdens upon long established trades and 
occupation, the balance of economic interest f ~wors 
the taxpayer and not the State. Probably the l;esf 
8 
CXJJlanation frn t71r rule is to l;e tmnul h1 flu 
tl1ron1 of ser11ri11.r; equality and uniformity in 
thr 1:mposition of the tar l)/{rdrn." Sntlicrla1)(1, l>P 
20:1, 294 11m1 29;)_ (Emphasis ad<lef1) 
"EmzJhasis l!clon,qs upon t71r ,r;encral ol;Jrtfi,.es of 
s11tli la11"s 1l'ifh a rieu· to G('('011IJJlisl1i11q 1111ifon11it.;1 
and eq11aJit11 rrm 011 q t 71 e rla ss of JJCrson.~ so 11.r; 7d to 
lJe ta.rrd." Suthf'rland, p. 297. (Emp1rnsis ac1(1ec1) 
POINT II. 
TNCOI\fE TAX RE'l1URNS FIL~JD PRIOR rro 
.JANUARY 1, 19G6 MAY BE FTLED ~\TT.AX 
RATES IN EFFECT PRIOR TO THF. ENAC'T-
I\lENT OF H. B. -81. 
The ::l6th Legislature of tho Stnto of Utnh 01rncte<1 
Honse Bi11 No. 81 to increase income tax rates on indi-
l'i<1nal income. Section 1 of House Bin No. SJ amcnc1oc1 
R<'ctio11 G9-J4-2, Utah Code Annotato(l, 1953, hy increas-
irnr the n1tc of hx imposccl on net taxahle income. Sec-
tion G of the Act provides: 
''The tax rates provided for herein s11a1l apply to 
all returns fi1cc1 on or after .fanuanT 1, 1966, for 
taxahle years commencing on or after .Tannary 1, 
1965." 
11l1iN cwdimt is the oprrntive srdion of the Act, Rpecih'i11g 
to ·what tax rctnrns the rates provic1ec1 for in Sections 
ii0-J4-2. Utah C'oclf' A1111otatec1, 1053, will he a1)p1icahle. 
The plain mraning- of this pr0Yisi011 makrs it manifest 
tl1:it ~hr inert>asl'd tax rates only appl~· to returns filed 
(ill or aftrr .Jnmrnry J, 1066. 
rrhe lower court, in this case, as well as the case of 
Mecham., ct af. v. State Tax Com mission, has ruled the 
above Section 5 of the statute to be not ambiguous: 
"Even when a court is convinced that the Legis-
lature really meant and intended something not 
expressed by the the phaseology of the Act, it will 
not deem itself authorized to depart from the plain 
meaning of the language which is free from am-
biguity.'' See Sutherland on Statutory Construc-
tion, page 314. 
It is a well-established axiom of statutory construc-
tion, that a statute will be given the plain meaning that 
arises from its reading. 
In Ringuwod v. State, 8 U. 2d 287, 333 P. 2d 94:-5, 
the Utah Supreme Court stated that a statute is normally 
to be interpreted according to the ordinary and usual 
meaning of the language used. The reason for the rule 
of construction is manifest. The easiest means by which 
a citizen has of determining what the law is is to read the 
statute. Subtle distinctions that the Legislature might 
have intended, cannot prevail over the plain meaning of 
the statute to the contrary. 
In People ex rel. Wood v. Sands, 102 Cal. 12, 36 Pac. 
404, it is stated: 
"When the intention of the legislature is so ap-
parent from the face of the statute that there can 
be no question as to its meaning, there is no room 
for construction.'' 
No other meaning can be drawn from the provisions of 
Section 5, Chapter 125, Laws of Utah 1965, exrept that 
10 
the substantive tax rates made applicable hy the legisla-
tion were to be oprrative only to returns filed after Jan-
nary 1, 1966. In<leed, on page 5 of the Utah State rrax 
Commission's brief, it is acknowledged that one of the 
alternatives the Legislature might have had in passing 
the ~mbject legislation would be '' ... that the rate in-
crease shall only apply to returns filed after a certain 
timr.'' This is exactly \Vhat the Legislature did. And 
again at page 15 of the Record on appeal in M eclwm et al, 
Y. State Tax Commission - the defendant, Tax Commis-
sion, states: "It should he noted that the hill does not 
require returns filed in 1965 to be subject to the increased 
rates hut only returns filed on or after January 1, 1966." 
It is a further well-stahlislwd axiom of statutory 
construction that effect will he given to every word in a 
statute, since it will he presumed that the Legislature did 
not intend that a word be used in a statute without it 
having some sie;nificance. Sutherland, Statritory Con-
struction, ·3rd Ed., Sec. 4705. Sutherland, op. cit., 
observes: 
"It is an elementary rule of construction that 
effect must be given, if possible, to every word, 
clause and sentence of a statute.' A statute sho111d 
be construed so that effect is given to all its pro-
visions, so that no part will he inoperativr or 
superfluous, void or insignificant, and so that one 
section will not destroy another unless the provis-
ion is the result of obvious mistake or error." 
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized the va-
li(lity of this axiom of statutory construction in State v. 
Oates, 118 Utah 182, 221 P. 2d 878. If the Legislature did 
11 
not intend a dirfon,nt rate to appl:- to r0m·ns filpc1 prior 
to .Janrnny 1, J 0GG, "\Yhy was legislation usP<1 to th<• effpd 
that the rates y,·ould he applicnlilc only to returns filed 
afiC'r .T mrnary l, 19G6. 
H may be that some members of the Legislature• 
had in mind something other than that expressec1 in the 
sfatute they passed, but as the Utah Supreme Court has 
noted, this giYes no basis to change the plain meaning 
of the statute. 
A case where the Utah Supreme Court was faced 
with a very similar argument was Park and Rer:reatin11 
Commission v. Departmrnt of Fi11a11r:e, 15 U. 2d 110, 388 
P. 2d 233. In that case, the 1961 Legislature appropriatc'd 
a sum of money in excess of $1,000,000.00 to the Park arn1 
Recreation Commission for the pnrchase of lands for 
a state park. Subsequently, the Park and Recreation 
Commission felt an additional sum of money "\Yas neces-
sary and was or the opinion that $150,000.00 more 1rns 
required. ,\n amendment in 1963 to the preYious appro-
priaticn was macle and the snm of $180,000.00 \ms 1111 
thnt 1Yas specified in tlw act. It was argued that thr 
cl0ar intention of the Legislature was to add the $150,-
000.00 to the previous sum appropriated. The Utah Su-
preme Court acknowledged that that might h:we been 
the intention of the Legislature, hut that since the lan-
gnage used was c1rar, that -would go1Tern. The court oh-
serYrd: 
'',\s to th0 J9G:i ad it S('C'rns nlrnost olffious tl1;tl 
the legislature did not intern] to rmmw11lnt0 tlll' 
12 
authOl'ity of tho FJ61 art to irnrclrn:-;o land for o-\·er 
a million <1ol1m· aggregate purehase prier, aml it 
seems also almost ohvions that it irnlulged error, 
in failing to note Ornt the 1963 amount \ms mrant 
to be an aclditiou. The legislature has the pre-
rogati,-e of making mistnkes, arnl it is not the jn-
(liciary to correct them if tlw language of the leg-
islation is clear and unamhignous. The 1063 act 
certainly is elear and mrnmhignons, and it is for 
the legislature, not us, to rectify the latter's mis-
take, if there he one here .... '' 
If however, the argument of the Utah State Tax Com-
mission is coned, that the provision establishing the fil-
ing elate for the tax rrturns demonstrates an intention 
to appl:- the increased rates to a11 calendar year returns 
for the year 1965, then it is obvious that Section 5 of 
Clwpter 125, Laws of Utah, 1965, is ambiguous, since this 
section crrates a different inference. This being so, the 
nmbignity must he resolYed in favor of the taxpayer. 
Jfoss v. Boaril of Commissioners of Salt Lake rity, 1 U. 
2nd 60, 261 P. 2d 961; Nonille Y. State Tax Commission, 
~)8 Utah 170, 97 P. 2cl 9:17; TV. F. .Jrnse11 Candy Com7wny 
\'. 8tate Tax Commission, 90 Utah 395, 61 P. 2d 629. 
The Utah State Tax Commission has acknowledged 
the ahove mentione<1 principle that ambiguity must be 
reso1Yec1 in favor of tlw taxpa~·er. 
POINT III 
(PLAINTIFF'S CROSS-APPEAL) 
H. B. -81 (36th Legislaturr) IS UNCONSTITU-
TION L\ L BliJ('A TTSE IT PERMITS DIS CRIMI-
13 
NATORY AND UNEQUAL APPLICATION OF 
INCOME TAX RATES AMONG U'I1AH CITI-
ZENS OF THE SAME CLASS. 
Point throe of the appellant's brief appears to con-
cede that calendar year taxpayers are affected differently 
hy the provisions of H. B. 81 than are fiscal year tax-
payers, but argn:~ that this does not make any difference 
to the validity of the act. 
Although Utah does not have a specific constitutional 
provision relating to uniformity in the application of 
i11come tax legislation, it does have a general provision, 
Article I, Section 24, that, "all laws of a general nature 
shall have uniform application." The absence of a spe-
cific provision relating to income tax uniformity appears 
to make little difference. Federal courts, and state conrts 
applying federal law, have long held that ineome fax 
legislation enacted by the states is subject to the pro-
visions of the equal protection clause of Amendmrnt XIV, 
Constitution of the United States. 
States having" uniform" income tax proviRionR ha Ye 
usually held that the provisions are substantially co-
extensive with the uniformity requirement of the equal 
protection clause. See, for example, Methodist Book Con-
cern v. r:allon·ay, 186 Ore. 585, 208 P.2d 319. 
By its terms H. B. 81 requires Utah taxpayers to 
pay income tax based upon a higher rate if their "taxable 
year" begins on or after ,January 1, 19GG, and if the:' 
filed their returns on or after .January 1, 1!16G. Tax-
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payers who would not come within this provision would 
indmil' fiscal year taxpayers ·whose year began before 
J:rnuary 1, 196;); ealendar year taxpayers who filed re-
turns prior to .J auuary 1, 1065; and taxpayers who are 
uot 011 an mrnual basis, such as the estates of taxpayers 
who died during the year la65, or citizens of Utah who 
('hanged their rc•sidcnce and domirile to another state 
during 1965. 
Although tl18 elassifirations we are talking about 
arise out of the ''effective date'' provision of H. B. 81, 
they are real classifications and it is necessary to deter-
mine their legitimacy under Article I, Section 24, of the 
Constitution of Utah and the equal protection clause of 
Amendment XIV of the Constitution of the United States. 
A number of decisions have held taxing statutes to 
he im'alid because the classifications established had no 
reas01:able relationship to the objects and purposes of 
the legislation. One of the earliest cases decided by the 
United States Supreme Court is Pollock v. Farmers Lor1n 
,f: Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 599, 15 S. Ct. 673, 39 L. Ed. 
759, in which an early inrome tax statute was held to be 
unconstitutional. Speaking of the statute the court 
said: 
''The inherent and fundamental nature and char-
acter of the tax is that of a rontrihution to the 
support of the goYernment, levied upon the prin-
ciple of equal and uniform apportionment among 
the persons taxed, and any other exaction does 
not rome within the legal definition of a tax. 
"ThiK inhrrent limitation upon the taxing 
power forhids the imposition of taxes which are 
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1111eq1rnl in tl1<'i1· opcrnti011 11JH>ll similm· ki11<1s o! 
p1·op0rt:,, nnd iie<·ess;.uil:, strikvs <101Y11 the gm:-:, 
Hl1l1 ;HhitTal')' ([isti11dio11s in tlw im•omp Jaw (\,; 
p;1sse(1 hY eo11gr<'ss. The la1Y, ns we have sern, 
<1istingnisl1es in tl10 tnxatio11 lwhn•en corporntion;; 
h)' PXl'mpting the pro1H•rt:, of some of them from 
taxation and h•\')'ing the tax 011 the p1·opert:· of 
oth0rs when tl1e <'orporations <1o not materially 
r1iffrr from 01w miotlwr in the ehararter of their 
lmsiness or in protedion reqnire<1 h:· tlw gover!l-
m<•nt. rl1rifli11g differenees in their mo<1es of husi-
1wss, lm t 11ot ill their resnlts, a re mac10 on th0 
gnnrnr 1 a m1 ocea si 011 of the gr ea t0st possihlc 
<1iffL•re11c C'S in the amount of taxes ]eYier1 np011 
t11eir inrome, sho-wing that the aetion of the JegiR-
JatiYe r>owrr upon them has lwen arhitrar:' nml 
eapririons arnl somdimes mPn•J:, f m1rifnl.'' 
A more rPee11t n•eoguition of the applirahility of i!ie 
l'<jltal protPdion el;rnse to tnxation l1y the states is forn1rl 
in Allied Stores of Ohio, l11c. 1-. Bo11·rrs, 8;)8 U.S. ;)22, 7~1 
S. Ct 4~~7, ;3 L. Ed. 2<1 -1-80, wherein tl1e eonrt, nlthongl1 
upholding n elm·;;;~fiC'ntio11 as reaso1rnhlr, mnf1e tlie fo1ln\\'-
rng statement: 
"*: '' ''There is <1 1Jo111t hc•:,orn1 \\'l1ie]1 th0 Stn'!P 
ca1111ot g·ri witl1011t ,-iolati1;g- the Eqnnl Pr(J1 udir111 
Clause. rr11c· Stnte mnst prnerr(1 npmi a r:1tiow11 
hasis a]l(1 ma:- not resort to ;1 clnssif1e~1tirrn tlwl 
is palpably ;nhitrnr)-. r11Jw rulr ofte11 ]ms lwf'll 
stated to l>C~ that the elnssifiration 'mnst rrst ll]JOll 
somr ground of diffrrl'nce bm-ing n fair ;rnc1 s11l1 
stantfal relation to the ol>jt>et of the legisfotinn.' 
[Citing cases.]" 
Deeision s in eon rts of sister st a ks lHffC al so recog-
nized the rn•(>(1 for a classifiration hasec1 npon some snl> 
sta11ti~1l grom1cl. In Blaustein v. I)euin, 178 .M<l. 423, 4 A 
:2(1 8Gl, :m income tax statute was hel<l invalid because 
of <liffore11ces it made in certain trust income. The Court 
of Appeals of :'.\faryland said: 
"Now, what the legislature bas done hv the Act 
of 1935, Ch. 302, is to singlP out the resident bene-
ficiaries of non-resident trusts 'wlwre the donor 
or testator creating sueh trust, is or was, at the 
time of creation of sue h trust, a resident of this 
state,' nncl impose upon such beneficiaries a tax 
of six per cent per annum on the income from 
such trusts. and it excuses, certainly does not in-
clude, other beneficiaries of trusts, such as resi-
dent beneficiaries of trusts foreign from their in-
cPption, and resident beneficiaries of wholly local 
trusts, though they are all exactly alike. The dis-
crimination is in taxing one group of persons 
answering the description of the act of 1935, with-
out including others who are similarly situated. 
* * * 
"In the opnnon of this court, Section 141 (a) 
of the Act of 1935, ch. 302, is invalid, because it 
sets up an arbitrary and unreasonable discrimi-
nation between persons of the same general 
clases. * * *" 
Tn Jfrnry v. 8l1ecinsky, 239 Ala. 293, 195 So. 222, the 
Rnpr2mc Court of Alabama struck down a Revenue Act. 
While recognizing that taxing statutes are not required 
to provide for "perfect equality" there is a requirement 
that some individuals of a class fairly arranged arc not 
:-:Pl<'dt•d to cany a burden not alike operative on all of 
1 lu• ebss, and that each local or sub-class must be reason-
1 lil<· all<l 110t ca1>ricious in order to he sustained. 
17 
l; l (; f ('(l I A t1 ((II tic UJ/(l p (I l'if it T ('(l r 0. Y. K eiducky 
Tu:r Co111missio11 et al., 278 Ky. 367, 128 R.\Y. 2(1 ;)81, the 
Court of Amwals of Ke11tucky saw iuvaliclit)· i11 a li-
C'P11se aml occupation tax. The conrt saicl: 
''-W'hilr tlt(' p1·0,·isions of S!'dion 171 of our ('011-
stit11tio11, n•quiring h1xrs to lw eqnal and uniform, 
appl)· in thPir fullness on])· to (lirPct taxation of 
l Jrorwrt)·, y0t t lw principa] of Pq nali t_\· and uni-
fo rmi 1y mnst llC' ohsPrn'd in imposing licrnsr and 
ocenpatio11 taxrs. Tlw uniformit_\· pnn·isi011 <lop:; 
not prrYent the classification of lmsinessrs, tradr~. 
profrssions or occnpati011s, arnl tl1r taxation of 
diffrrent classes at clifferent rates, but the tax 
mnst he nniform on all snh.ircts -within tbe class 
to which it is appl)·ing, arnl the classification 
mnst he madr according to 1rnturn] and \Yr11 r0cog-
niZC'(l Jilws of cli stincti 011. Th 0 di ff err11eP npon 
"·hich thP cbssification is liascc1 must he snhsta11-
tia1. * * * The principle of 0qnalit_\· ancl nniformity 
in taxation is onP of the corner stonc•s of our eon-
stitution, and has been zealously guarded by the 
decisions d this conrt in applying it, not only to 
statutes 10Y)·ing a din•ct tax on property, but to 
Rtatutes and municipal ordina11ces imposing occu-
pation taxes." 
In OJJi11io11 of' tl1e .!11stices (N. H. Hl65), 208 A. 458, 
the Supreme Court of N cw Hampshire recognized limit:-: 
upon tlw elassif::in)!: rip;hts of tlw lrg-is1ntnre "·itli r('~ll('ct 
to reYenue mrnsnreR mid exprrsRecl an opinion that n rr\'-
enue rneaRnrr heeanse of improper elassifirations 1n1:-: 
im·alid. The eonrt Raid: 
"House Bill 2!12 wonlc1 tax the inconws from rwr 
sonal sen·iees of all kirnls. inelrnling fll'Of Pssi01i:11 
sen·ices, <'XCPT>t that it would not i ax i11eom(' fron1 
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penmual services of an identical sort 'for which 
wages or salaries arc recein~d from an employer' 
(,1 V. F'or L'Xample, a s<:•lf-cmployf'd carpenter, 
pai11ter, plumber or general repairman would pay 
a tax. But bis assistants, rcceivi11g wages or sal-
aries for an identical service, would pay 11oth-
ing. * '~ * Such examples can he multiplied almost 
indefinitely, hut it appears to us mmec~essary to 
do so. 
"We have said that a tax imposed on rorpora-
tions, while allowing individuals engaged in like 
businesses or vocations to go free, is unconsti-
tutional. [Citing cases] The co11verse of this 
is also true. [Citing cases] By incorporating his 
lmsiness and drawing a salary, any owner of a 
business could avoid personal liability for the tax. 
The small corporation by disbursing its receipts 
and the payments of salaries and other expenses, 
could likevv·ise avoid liability for the tax. * * * It 
follows that this provision cannot be held con-
stitutional." 
In City of Lonisville et al. v. Koelzler r;t al., (Ky. 
1D5-l:) 264 S.W. 2d 80, the Court of Appeals of Kentucky 
held unconstitutional an ordinance imposing minimum 
annual license fops on businesses regardless of the amount 
of business done in the city. Noting a provision that none 
of th2 minimum fee would he returned, and that tlw law 
was a revenue measure designed in part to obtain revenue 
from itinerant merchants, the court said: 
"Section 9( e) really does not apply to itinerant 
merchants as such, hut only to those merC'hants 
who srll or do lmsinPss from a fixed location for a 
period of h'ss than a year. Tf such a merehant 
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were to operate a business for ele,·en months, fo1 
example, and made no profit, he 1rnnk1 he subject 
to a license fee of $2:50.00, while a11othcr mrrchant 
in the same line of enclraYor who managed to stay 
in business for a yrar without making a profit 
would owe no tax and not br out-of-pocket for the 
license to do lmsi11ess. * * ~· The fact alone that a 
merchant is in lrnsinrss for less than a yrar is 
not a sound rrason for placing him in a cliffrrent 
classification for tax purposes as that occupied hy 
his compC'titor who stays in 1rnsiness for more thnn 
a year. Th(-, differencre upon which the classifica-
tion is hased must he substantial and upon a nat-
ural and reasonable hasis. '' 
In ln re Vanderbilt's Estate, 281 N. Y. 297, 22 N. K 
2d 379, the Court of Appeals of New York discussed the 
limits upon the pm,·er of a legislature to classif>r in estate 
tax legislation: 
"Thr serious question in this case is whether the 
tax violates the constitution of the United States. 
TJw state bas a broad po\ver of taxation, but in 
the exercise of that power it ma>r not provide a 
measure for tax which is entirel>r arhitrary and 
which produces inequality and injustice so great as 
to cleprin' a taxpayer of thr eq1rnl protection of 
the law. * * * Always tJwre mnst he some rea-
son hased on facts, not fiction, for imnosing n 
particular tax upon a particular class, and absence 
of an>r hasis for the classification may not he 
hid<len hy an arbitrm7 creation or a conclnsiYr 
presumption. * * * 
'' Co1rnidrring the -..,ra]idifr of the tax three factors 
must he con~tantly kept' in mind: thr nature of 
the tax, the measure of the fax, and its inci-
dence. * * ~'' 
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In Barker Bros., 111c. v. City of Los .A.ngeles, 10 Cal. 
2d GO,j, 7() P. 2d 97, the Supreme Court of California held 
iuntlid a general occnpati.011al license tax imposeLl by 
1hc City of Los Angeles, on the ground that the classifi-
rations in the statute were arbitrary. The classifications 
related to differences between stores "commonly known 
as department stores'' and other stores. The Supreme 
Court of California said: 
''\Viele disrretion is g-iven to legislatin' bodies in 
the imposition of taxes, and the right to classify 
for such purposes is of wide range and flexibility. 
* '~ * 'The equal protection clause does not de-
tract from the right of the state justly to exert its 
taxing power or prevent it from adjusting its leg-
islation to differences in situation or forbid classi-
fication in that connection "but it does require 
that the classification be not arbitrary, but based 
on a real and substantial difference having a rea-
sonable relation to the subject of the particular 
legislation." [Citing Power Co. v. Saunders, 27 4 
U. S. 490, 493, 47 Sup. Ct. 678, 71 L. Ed. 17165, 
and other cases.] 
"While the state may classify broadly the sub-
jects of taxation, it must do so on a rational h(lsis 
so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall 
he treated alike.'' 
For authorities holding generally that income tax 
statutes may not discriminate in favor of one as against 
another in the same position or class, see Cook v. Walter 
Dry Goods Co., 212 Ark. 485, 206 S.W. 2d 742; Hartman v. 
Sfate Commission of Rerenue and Taxation, 164 Kan. 62, 
187 P. 2d 939; Martin v. Cage, (Ky.) 134 S.W. 2d 966; 
r'71 ri-"fo7Jhrr v. J r1111 in gs, 122 vV. Va. 665, 12 S.E. 2d 813; 
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Ap1J1'al of r(/)/ IJ.IJke, 217 \Yi:-; .. -f28, ~.)~l l\'.\Y. 700, 9S 
..:\.L.H. I:l:32; 1 C'noley on Ta.rntirm ( 4tlt J1~cl. 228. 
Tn S'taf(' <'X rel llall'ort/1 ,-. Bernt.-.·e11, ()8 Tela. G39. 
200 P. 2tl 1007, the Supreme Court of Idaho struck clown 
an income tax statutt> giving residents a ereclit of $1,GOO 
against net income in ease of a husband and wifo, to-
gether with $200 for each dependent, lmt g-iving no11-
resicle11t::-: a credit of only $700, as violating the privileges 
and immunities clause of the Federal Constitution. It 
would also seem to be in viola ti on of the erprnl protection 
claus8. 
In light of the tests set out abon~, the provisions of 
H.B. -81 arc unconstitutional and void (under Utah mid 
U. S. Constitutions) insofar as they discriminate lw-
bYeen "slow" calendar year taxpayers on the one hand, 
and fiscal year taxpayers, non-annual taxpayers, arnl 
"fast" calendar year taxpayers on the other. Iii its 
brief the appellant Tax Commission argues that there is a 
legitimate reason for making a distinction between fiscal 
year taxpayers and calendar year taxpayers. It is dif-
ficult to see any basis for the distinction. 
Payment upon a fiscal year, while authorized hy 
statute. is not prescribed by it. Whether a taxpayer file~ 
upon a fiscal or calendar year basis is pretty much lc·ft 
up to the desires and accounting methods of the taxpayl'r 
and the approval or agreement of the Tax Commission. 
It is provided hy 59-14-12 Utah Code Annotated HJ:'i:l 
that net income shall be eompnted upon the hasis A 
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1l1c t:l'l:}J<l,\'('l''s annual ac<·om1ti11g perio<L But 5!l-14:-1-± 
('outernplates that a taxpayer may change his aecou11ti11g 
period. 1Tnder t11e pro,·isiom; of .)9-14-13 lTtah Code "\11-
11otatcd 19;):3, if a taxpayer \Yith the approval of the rrnx 
( 'ommission <'hm1ges the basis of eomputiug net i1wome 
from a ealernlar )·rar to a fiscal year, a separate' return 
is to he made for the period between the elose of the 
last C'Hl<>ll<lnr )·e;1r for whieh t11e return was made arnl 
tlH• elate> desiguatrd as the elost• of the fiseal year. Con-
t·ri,·a lily, some taxpayers eoulcl still bring themselves 
under the old tax rate hy obtaining approval from the 
'l'ax Commi8sion to eha11ge from a ealernlar year basis 
to a fiseal year basis for the year 1965. 
Tm1Rmuch a8 income tax statutes arc related pr1-
mmil)· to the raising of r<>venue and standing the costs 
of government, there is no significant relationship be-
hYPe11 the dassifications established by H. B. -81. Fiscal 
:'ear taxpayers, the only clifferenee hetween whom and 
calendar year taxpayers is that they lrnvc a different 
a<'eom1ti11g period, ought to hear the same burden of 
lax inrrease as calendar year taxpayers; persons who re-
move from the state, or estates whose predecessor tax-
pa~'ers died during the calendar year, should not be per-
mitted to avoid the tax by such a happenstance. By its 
plain terms the statute permits some henefits to those 
laxpnyers who are able to race to the Tax Commission 
with returns for the calendar year 1965. 
It is submitted that the classifications arc arbihan . ' 
and cannot he justified hy the argumt>nt that the legi~ 
lature ought not to have to bother \Yith snch deblil. 
CONCLUSIO)J 
r:ro achieve the results contended for hv the State Tax . . 
Commission would require this court to go into the leg-
islative lmsiness itself and either excise significant pro-
Yisions from H. B. -81 or write other provisions into it. 
Time and again this court has held, consistent with views 
almost uniYersally recognized, that it may not find that 
because of the "intention" of the legislature a statute 
should be held to have some meaning that it clearl~· 
doesn't have. 
Section 5 of H. B. 81 which presently reads: 
"The tax rates pnwidrd for herein shall apply to 
all tax returns filed on or after J mrnary 1, 1966, 
for taxable >"ears commencing 011 or after .Tmnrnn 
1, 1965. ,, 
Should, says the Tax Commission, he re-written to rend 
as follows: 
"The tax rates provided for herein shall apply to 
all taxable years commencing on or after .Jan-
uary 1, 196:).'' 
Not only should this court refuse to enter the field of 
legislative draftsmanship, but it should declare invalid 
any act of the legislature \vhich contravenes the constitu-
tional provisions requiring uniformit>" of legislatioll. 
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Hrgtrnlless of the interpretation given by the court to the 
rights of early filers, H. B. 81 is discriminatory with 
respect to a large group of taxpayers in that it has made 
thr question of liability for the increased rates depend 
npon a circumstance which has nothing to do with the 
Jrg·itimnte puroses of the revenue legislation. vVe sub-
mit that the portion of the trial court's judgment con-
struing the meaning of H. B. 81 should be affirmed and 
that the entire act should be declared unconstitutional 
and void because of its lack of uniform application and 
its denial of equal protection of the laws. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ALLEN E. MECHAM 
FRANK V. NELSON 
LORIN N. PACE 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Plaintiff, 
Respondents and 
Cross Appellants. 
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